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Abstract – There have been an extensive use of  Convolutional  Neural  Networks  (CNNs)  in healthcare applications.  Presently, 
GPUs are the most prominent and dominated DNN accelerators to increase the execution speed of  CNN algorithms to improve 
their performance as well as the Latency. However, GPUs are prone to soft errors. These errors can impact the behaviors of the 
GPU dramatically. Thus, the generated fault may corrupt data values or logic operations and cause errors,  such as  Silent  Data 
Corruption.  unfortunately,  soft errors propagate from the physical level (microarchitecture) to the application level (CNN  model). 
This paper analyzes the reliability of the AlexNet model based on two metrics: (1) critical kernel vulnerability (CKV) used to identify the 
malfunction and light- malfunction errors in each kernel, and (2) critical layer vulnerability (CLV) used to track the malfunction and 
light-malfunction errors through layers. To achieve this, we injected the AlexNet which was popularly used in healthcare applications 
on NVIDIA’s GPU, using the SASSIFI fault injector as the major evaluator tool. The experiments demonstrate through the average error 
percentage that caused malfunction of the models has been reduced from 3.7% to 0.383% by hardening only the vulnerable part 
with the overhead only 0.2923%. This is a high improvement in the model reliability for healthcare applications.
Keywords – Convolutional neural networks, Reliability, Soft errors, GPUs, healthcare applications
1. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are special type 
DNNs that have shown state-of-the-art results on many 
competitive benchmarks such as medical image classifi-
cation [1], pathological brain detection [2], and disease 
detection [3] among many others. In fact, reports have 
revealed that CNNs is considered to be more effective, 
for they own the paradigms of more biologically in-
spired structures than other traditional networks [4]. This 
has led to the development of different CNNs including 
AlexNet [5], VGG [6], and DenseNet [7]. These CNNs de-
rive their competence from being trained to a large da-
tabase named ImageNet, Large-Scale Visual Recognition 
Challenge [8]. Hence, they occupy high positions of suit-
ability in modern image classification. In fact, these ma-
chine learning networks have the ability to understand 
hierarchically classified data from lower to higher levels 
by developing a deep pattern of the input data. Based on 
these salient features and performance of CNNs, several 
researchers have exploited them to perform new tasks 
like the classification of medical images. Specifically, the 
knowledge acquired when these networks have been 
trained on millions of images are transferred into new 
tasks, thereby taking advantage of certain weights of their 
learned parameters (i.e., Transfer learning). 
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CNNs are applied to a wide variety of accelerators (i.e. 
FPGAs, GPUs, DSPs, etc.) each of which has its own ele-
ments, behaviour and execution flow. However, due to 
their computational power, graphics processing units 
(GPUs) are extensively used in CNNs to overcome the 
inherent computational challenges of healthcare ap-
plications [9] [10] [11] [12]. Notwithstanding, there are 
certain GPU units that if exposed to soft errors, can dis-
rupt the reliability of the GPU operations; these units 
include memory elements such as register file and log-
ic resources such as Arithmetic Logic Units (ALUs) [13]. 
Hence, when using GPUs to accelerate CNNs models in 
healthcare applications it is important to ensure that 
potential data corruption is avoided and failure rates 
must be reduced to the minimum and should not ex-
ceed 10 Failures in Time (FIT), which is defined as errors 
in109 hours of operations [14]. Thus, soft errors that oc-
cur in GPUs can eventually lead to misclassification of 
objects in CNNs, and the consequences would be disas-
trous. For instance, in [15] the authors have reported in-
stances of the da Vinci robotic surgical system adverse 
events that included some kind of patient injuries and 
death, and reported as a “Malfunction”, “unanticipated” 
and “unintended” errors. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), reported that 1078 of the adverse events 
(10.1%) were unintended errors (soft errors) happened, 
including 52 injuries and 2 deaths [16].
In this contribution, the reliability of the AlexNet 
model on a GPU was anayzed by conducting series  of 
fault-injection campaigns, using NVIDIA’s SASSIFI The 
first significant contribution of this study is the determi-
nation of soft errot resilience  in AlexNet through com-
prehensive analysis, and ranking of vulnerable model 
parts from the perspective of kernel and layers. The 
second contribution is reduction of soft errors through 
a Selective Hardening approach. The subsequent sec-
tions of this paper are includes Section 2 related work. 
Section 3 which is brief background of AlexNet, Graph-
ics Processing Units, and Soft Errors Propagation in 
GPUs. Section 4 desribes the Selective Hardening Strat-
egy, and Section 5 contains the methodology while 
Section 6 presents the results generated from analysis 
of the Kernels and Layers. The experimental results and 
their analysis is presented in Section 7, whereas the 
Time Overhead Execution comparison is presented in 
Section 8 and the conclusion is in Section 9.
2. RELATED WORK 
There are several studies in [17][18][19] [20][21] au-
thors evaluated and analyzed the reliability of CNN 
models. Hence, it has been established that there are 
varieties of CNN architectures, with each having differ-
ent bevavior and workflows. The different CNNs have 
been implemented on various accelerators including 
GPUs, ASICs, and TPU, through their peculiar execution 
flow based on their varying components. This makes 
it difficult to directly generalize the case of a particu-
lar CNN to other architectures [22]. Andru et al. [23] 
proposed a CNN architecture called EndoNet to auto-
matically recognize the presence of surgical tools. The 
model trained on the Cholec80 dataset. But, the au-
thors address the reliability of the proposed model in 
terms of temporal precision, which is different from our 
perspective. Amy et al. [24] introduce an approach to 
analyzing and tracking the movements of the surgical 
tool. They used the CNN model and m2cai16 dataset 
to train the model. However, the authors did not con-
sider the reliability of the model. Grewal et al. [25] de-
scribed an approach for automated brain hemorrhage 
detection from computed tomography. The study used 
DenseNet201 architecture as an emergency diagnosis 
tool, but the authors did not consider the reliability of 
such a model for the intended application, which is ac-
tually a safety-critical application, based on real-time 
CNN model detection. 
In another study by Dunnmon et al. [26], three CNN 
models (Alexnet, ResNet, and DenseNet201) were used 
to classify chest radiographs into groups categorized 
as either normal or abnormal. This approach can help 
to prioritize abnormal chest radiographs automatical-
ly. In addition, the use of chest radiographs to predict 
multiclass thoracic diagnosis was reliably addressed in 
the study. Notwithstanding, the reliability of the mod-
els has not been considered. In another study, robot-
assisted surgery was proposed by Wang and Fey [27]. 
Specifically, a deep analytical framework for learning 
and assessment of skills in surgical training was imple-
mented. The individual skill levels in multivariate data 
with various time series were mapped to the motion 
kinematics using a deep CNN. Interestingly, instanta-
neous feedback can be obtained from personalized 
surgical training if the model is incorporated into the 
robot-assisted surgical systems pipeline. However, the 
reliability of the model to the intended application was 
not considered by the authors. Notably, several ap-
proaches have been developed to reduce the occur-
rence of the soft error in GPUs, through software solu-
tions. This include Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) 
and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). However, the 
major drawback to the use of these solutions is the 
runtime overheads.
3. BACKGROUND
3.1. AlExNEt NEURAl NEtwoRK
AlexNet is a CNNs architecture, composed of eight 
layers with weights; the first five are convolutional lay-
ers and the remaining three are fully connected layers. 
The fully-connected layers generally consist of 4096-di-
mensional features [5]. AlexNet has been confirmed to 
be suitable for classifying medical images for diseases 
like lung diseases, heart challenges and, cancer. As pre-
sented in  (Fig. 1), the input image in AlexNet should 
be augmented to an image size of 227 x 227 x 3. The 
window shape size applied to the first  layer 96 convo-
lution filter is 11 × 11, whereas it is 5×5 in the second 
93Volume 12, Number 2, 2021
layer 256 convolution filter. Subsequently, 3×3 window 
size is applied to the remaining 384, 384, and 256 con-
volution filters, respectively. A maximum pooling layer 
of 3×3, with 2 strides is present in the network after 
the first, second, and last convolutional layers. Asides 
these five convolution layers, 4096 neuron outputs are 
present in the seven fully-connected layers following 
the fifth convolutional layer. Then, one fully connected 
output layer is situated at the end of the network which 
initially contains  7 output classes. Generally, an excel-
lent performance of tasks involving computer visions 
can be achieved by using important keys like  Drop-
out, ReLU, and preprocessing. The pre-trained AlexNet 
model with and weight configuration can be found on 
the Darknet framework.
3.2. GRAPhICS PRoCESSING UNItS
The use of GPUs have recently extended beyond be-
ing used solely for graphics tasks to being used in more 
general-purpose devices. In fact, currently considered 
as the main DNN accelerators [28]. The increased inter-
est in GPUs is mainly associated with its great computa-
tional power and massively parallel architecture. Based 
on these, they are more preferable in algorithms that 
require intense computing such as neural networks. 
It can be seen in (Fig. 2) that the basic GPUs architec-
ture is based on generation of Compute Unified Device 
Architecture (CUDA) as the programming model. The 
basic building block unit in GPUs is known as Stream-
ing Multiprocessor (SM). The SM is made up of several 
components such as streaming processors (SPs) that 
are used in arithmetic calculations, and special func-
tion units (SFUs) which function for sine, cosine, and 
square root operations. In addition, the SM comprises 
load/store (LD/ST) units used in memory operations, 
as well as many other registers for caches. SMs are the 
core idea of parallelism in GPUs. The basic structure 
of SMs in the GPU architecture is shown in Fig 2, each 
of which can only execute one thread in a clock cycle 
with dedicated registers from the register file. The warp 
scheduler to be executed next on the CUDA cores in a 
given SM selects a group of 32 threads (called a warp), 
and then instructions are dispatched by the instruction 
dispatch unit.  The threads in each warp execute in a 
SIMT (single instruction, multiple threads) fashions. The 
global system memory of a GPU is located in the dy-
namic random-access memory and the global memory 
would normally be accessible to the SM. The L2 cache is 
a shared memory mainly shared by the SPs in the SMs. 
Hence, read and write instructions can be executed 
at the L2 cache level by each SM. On the other hand, all 
the SPs in an SM can access the register file. The register 
file is basically mapped in the SMs to enhance compu-
tational performance through data caching for the run-
ning threads on each SM.
3.3. Soft ERRoRS PRoPAGAtIoN IN GPUS
The features of modern GPUs can be significantly af-
fected by radiation strikes either in space or on earth 
and this can invariably result in computational failure 
or data corruption. Therefore, one of the notable unreli-
ability sources in modern systems is soft errors. This is 
because electronic devices like GPUs would malfunc-
tion when they are struck by high-energy particles [29]. 
Usually, the tolerance to failure in safety-critical sys-
tems is restricted to 10 Failures in Time (FIT). Therefore, 
since soft errors in DNN accelerators (GPU inclusive) are 
more deleterious compared to other electronic devic-
es, there is a need to pay deliberate attention to them 
for two main reasons.
Firstly, the complex memory hierarchy is used for im-
proved latency. Secondly, the massively-parallel struc-
ture of the GPUs, that tends to disperse a single fault fig. 1. AlexNet Architecture
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to multiple faults. Usually, when memory elements of 
a GPU (indicated by the red sections in Fig. 3) are hit 
by particles, it can significantly affect all the threads 
that utilize such storage components. When functional 
components of the GPU such as ALU (INST) or Floating-
point (FP) units are hit by a particle, it creates tempo-
rary-voltage pulses, Single Event Transients (SETs). The 
SET can then travel through the logic components of 
the GPU where it can be captured by a storage com-
ponent. Specifically, a latch or flip-flop would trigger 
the flip of one or more bits from one value to another 
such as from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. However, this can be 
curtailed by applying a fault detection technique such 
as DMR, TMR, and ABFT. Generally,  faults generated in 
GPUs in form of data values or logic operations often 
results in errors like Silent Data Corruption (SDC), sys-
tem hang otherwise called Detected Unrecoverable Er-
ror (DUE), or outright crash of the application. 
However, the errors might sometimes not result in an 
observable error in which case it is known as Masked 
errors. The propagation of errors could be via different 
processes, in this case, layers, until they arrive at the 
program output (AlexNet) where they will eventually 
lead to problems such as the misclassification of ob-
jects. Due to this,  soft error in GPU is a very critical issue 
in safety-critical healthcare applications where high re-
liability is generally required. This is mainly due to the 
fact that even small errors might lead to serious injury 
or death as reported by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) department [30].
fig. 2. GPU architecture and memory
Ionizing particles
(a) Single Memory cell (bit)
(b) Memory Byte (8-bits)
fig. 3. Memory-element strikes
4. SELECTIVE HARDENING STRATEGY
In this section, we developed Selective Hardening 
Strategy (SHS) by identifying the most vulnerable ker-
nels for AlexNet, via fault injection (soft errors). In order 
to identify the most vulnerable kernels in the AlexNet 
model, we present a methodology (section 4). The key 
concept of SHS is that it is based on the well-known 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), and it intertwines 
three copies of the instructions and adds majority vot-
ing. In short, this SHS mitigation consists of triple ker-
nels, by means of majority voters. Based on this con-
cept, our strategy is a selective solution that protects 
only the vulnerable kernels instead of duplicating the 
whole as in DMR and TMR, to reduce the overheads, 
and thereby offering more flexibility to designers.
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. DAtASEt 
The AlexNet model was trained and evaluated with 
a Cholec80  dataset. Eighty cholecystectomy videos 
which were recorded at the Strasbourg University Hos-
pital  (25 fps) are contained in the dataset [23]. In addi-
tion, tool presence annotation is present in the dataset 
at 1 fps. Seven different tools were utilized in the dataset 
including hook, clipper, irrigator, bipolar, grasper, speci-
men  bag, and scissors.  If at least half the tip of the tool 
appears in the scene, then it is considered a present tool. 
The AlexNet was trained with the first  forty  videos while 
the remaining videos were used for validation.
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5.2. fAUlt-INJECtIoN SEtUP
A Maxwell architecture-based GPU GTX 750 Ti was 
used for this purpose [31], with a SASSIFI fault injec-
tor which was primarily used to assess the reliabil-
ity of AlexNet model runs on GPUs. This was achieved 
through fault injection campaigns which made it easier 
to determine the possibility of a low-level corruption to 
propagate to the output. Notably, the AlexNet model 
was trained on the Cholec80  dataset for the surgical 
tool detection. With this tool, it was possible to carry 
out fault injection through three distinct modes. The 
first mode is the Register File (RF) mode which was 
used to determine the Architectural Vulnerability Fac-
tor (AVF) of the register file, as well as the response of 
our model (AlexNet), to errors present in the memory 
elements. The second mode is the Instruction Output 
Address (IOA) mode while the third mode is the In-
struction Output Value (IOV) mode. The second and 
third modes (IOA and IOV) were used evaluate the Pro-
gram Vulnerability Factor (PVF). In addition, they were 
used to investigate how a single error modifies the re-
sult of instruction and propagates to the program out-
put (AlexNet).
A total of 1000 faults was injected for each of the 
three modes RF, IOA, and IOV. this number of injections 
was enough to guarantee that the worst-case statistical 
error bars at 95% confidence are at 1.96%. Notably, var-
ious bit-flip models can be obtained from SASSIFI in-
cluding zero value, single bit-flip, a random value, and 
multiple bit-flip. Nevertheless, only the single bit-flip 
and random value models were selected for the three 
injection modes of this present study. These models 
were preferentially selected because single-bit flip is 
more suitable and realistic for memory errors. On the 
other hand, all the other three bit-flip models are rep-
resented by the random value. The AVF of the register 
file is measured when errors are injected with RF mode 
while the PVF of the algorithm is measured if the errors 
are injected with IOA and IOV. 
As a consequence of fault injection and comparison 
of program output with the golden output (i.e., the 
pure outcome), three categories are expected, Masked, 
DUE, or SDC. It should be noted that SDC is the only 
error of interest to this study when studding the error 
propagation within the model. This is because crash 
and hand errors (DUEs) are not being propagated to a 
subsequent layer. Similarly, masked errors are instan-
taneously masked at the location of occurrence. The 
SDC errors and the mechanism of their propagation 
through layers were further grouped into three catego-
ries, for a better understanding of the concept. The first 
group is the Malfunction SDCs which represent errors 
that propagate, arrive at the program output, and alter 
the probabilities vector thereby impacting the object’s 
rank via misclassification. The second groups are the 
Light-Malfunction SDCs. These are errors that propa-
gate, arrive at the program output, and alters the prob-
abilities without changing the object’s rank. This situa-
tion is otherwise called tolerable SDC meaning object 
misclassification did not occur. The third groups are the 
No-Malfunction SDCs which are the error that propa-
gates without reaching the final program output. This 
means the errors are masked in some layers but this 
group of SDCs are different from Masked errors which 
do not propagate at all.   
6. KERNELS AND LAYERS FAULT INJECTION 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results generated from our fault-injection cam-
paign, and their analysis are presented in this section. 
A detailed sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess 
the resilience of the AlexNet model. This was performed 
through the evaluation of two metrics. The first metric 
is the critical kernel vulnerability (CKV) which helps to 
recognize the presence of malfunction and light-mal-
function errors in each kernel. The second metric is the 
critical layer vulnerability (CLV) which enables tracking 
of malfunction and light-malfunction errors within the 
layers.
6.1. CKV
As discussed in section 2.1, several layers are pres-
ent in the Alexnet model. Implementation of these lay-
ers on a GPU would result in the generation of several 
kernels (special functions) for each layer. Notably, the 
kernel is a component of the source code that is imple-
mented on a GPU, not a CPU and the kernels have dis-
tinctly peculiar computing characteristics. Therefore, all 
the static kernels required for a particular task is need-
ed for an in-depth analysis of the vulnerability levels of 
the different kernels to malfunction and light-malfunc-
tion errors. This is also required to determine how they 
influence the final output of the model through object 
classification. Nevertheless, we only consider the ker-
nels that are required for inference whereas the kernels 
used for training not incorporated as presented in Ta-
ble 1. After fault injection, each kernel of the injected 
program is analyzed and the most vulnerable kernels 
of our AlexNet are determined. It is worth noting that 
in Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and  Fig. 6, the probabilities of the whole 
graph sum up to 100% rather than the vertical bars of 
each kernel. This is because the AlexNet model pro-
gram consists of all these kernels in Table 1.  In other 
words, AlexNet programs are divided into small pieces 
of programs (kernels) that are executed in the GPU.
The kernels that produce a larger amount of errors 
can be easily identified by observing  Fig. 4, Fig. 5, 
and  Fig. 6. Likewise, the resilient kernels can be seen 
in the stated figures. Generally, Malfunction, Light-
Malfunction, and DUEs in RF, IOA, and IOV are notice-
able for all the kernels. However, the two kernels with 
the highest vulnerability in the AlexNet model are Im-
2col and Add_bias. In contrast, only a small number of 
DUEs, Malfunction and Light-Malfunction are notice-
able in the other kernels which indicates that they are 
highly resilient to soft errors. Similarly, the Fill kernel 
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shows little small Malfunction and Light-Malfunction 
error which suggests that they are highly resilient to 
soft errors. It can also be observed that the building of 
one CNN layer such as Conv. Or activations layers can 
be obtained from the contributions of more than one 
kernel. Statistically, it is easier to identify the layers that 
are more susceptible to faults, thereby facilitating de-
cision-making at the error mitigation step. It is evident 
in Fig. 4 that the kernels in the RF mode produce larger 
number of DUE errors, compared to Malfunction and 
Light-Malfunction errors. In contrast, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 
shows that the kernels in IOA and IOV modes tend to 
produce higher levels of Malfunction and Light-Mal-
function errors compared to DUE errors. The reason for 
this behavior as reported by [32] is that RF injection is 
the lowest injection level whereas higher injection lev-
els are performed at IOA and IOV sites because instruc-
tions are manipulated.  Generally, the result discussed 
here indicates that different vulnerabilities are associ-
ated with the static kernels of the AlexNet model. These 
results make it easy to determine the kernels that need 
to be duplicated as a means of saving costs, rather than 
duplicating the entire, which is a very costly process.






multiplication operation and  
add biases to the necessary 
parameters after the matrix 
multiplication
Max pooling Forward_maxpool
To reduce the spatial dimension 
of the input volume for next 
layers
Activation Activation_array
Apply nonlinearity to the feature 
maps to reduce the input 
linearity for the next layer
Softmax Softmax To calculating the probabilities of each class
table 1. AlexNet inference kernels and their 
corresponding layers
6.2. ClV
For a detailed understanding of the mechanism of 
error propagation through the layers of AlexNet to the 
output, the PVF was measured while the fault-injection 
mode is in the IOA and IOV. Fig. 7 to Fig. 9 presents the 
error propagation at each AlexNet layer, showing their 
different sensitivity to soft errors. Hence, the errors 
(Malfunction and No-Malfunction) that are propagated 
from the injected layers can be tracked to the last layer. 
The three SDC categories were investigated for each 
layer and the categories were calculated as discussed 
in section 4.1. The AVF and PVF values were measured 
for the given errors to determine the layers with a high 
probability to generate errors that can significantly al-
ter the model prediction (object misclassification). The 
first observation is that the probability values of each 
layer do not sum up to 100%. The reason is that if a 
layer is injected, it produces three types of errors: DUE, 
Masked, and SDC. However, because in this subsection, 
we intend to analyze the propagation of errors, and 
only SDC errors propagate through layers. Therefore, 
we shall mainly focus on the three SDC types which are 
Malfunction SDCs, Light-Malfunction SDCs, and No-
Malfunction  SDCs. This is the reason why they do not 
sum up to 100%. 
It is evident in Fig. 7 that in RF mode, the layers only 
tend to generate zero amounts of Malfunction. Layers 0 
to 6 generates big amounts of Light-Malfunction on an 
average 12.57% AVF. On the other hand, the layers with 
No-Malfunction is on the average of 3.9%. This is an 
indication that RF injections present a less significant 
influence on the resilience of layers against Malfunc-
tion errors. However, different amount of DUE errors is 
produced by the layers, due to reasons earlier stated in 
Section 6.1. The injection of faults into the IOA and IOV 
generates SDC errors in different layers, and this influ-
ences their resilience. Therefore, these two modes are 
discussed and analyzed in further detail. However, a 
lesser percentage of DUE errors was generated by the 
IOA and IOV injections, compared to RF mode.
 As can be seen in Figure 8, in the IOA mode, layers 0, 
1, and 7 generate Malfunction errors of  0.2% and this 
value is considered too high in safety critical applica-
tions. However, they still generate Light-Malfunction 
with an approximate value of 18.6% due to the AlexNet 
structure. On the other hand, 67.9% of the injected 
faults represent No-Malfunction. Likewise, several per-
centages of DUE errors are produced by the layers on 
the average 1%. However, about half of the layers in-
cluding layer 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 are not signifi-
cantly affected by DUE errors. As illustrated in Fig. 9 for 
the IOV mode, an average Malfunction value of 0.8% 
was generated by the layers. This significantly impacts 
the reliability of the model which suggests that the 
percentage is unacceptable. About 3.4% of the total 
Malfunction generated by the model was statistically 
contributed by layers 0 and 2. In addition, the largest 
percentage of Light-Malfunction and No-Malfunction 
were produced by these two layers which indicates 
that they are more vulnerable than other layers of the 
model. In SASSIFI, IOV mode is considered to be the 
highest injection level among the three modes and this 
is why layers injections performed through IOV mode is 
most unlikely to terminate the model execution.  Gen-
erally, from the  IOA and IOV model results presented 
in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, layers 0 and 2 generate more Light-
Malfunction errors and No-Malfunction compared to 
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other layers present in the network. In addition, the 
convolutional (11x11 and 5x5) of the AlexNet as de-
scribed in Fig. 1 is represented by these layers. Based on 
the explanation in Section 2.1, linear function is the ac-
tivation function within these layers, and this equates 
the output and input thereby retaining the initial size. 
This observation clearly describes the structure of the 
AlexNet model itself, whereby larger input sizes are 
possessed by these layers. The direct relationship be-
tween the execution time of each layer and the corre-
sponding exposure time in soft errors is not surprising 
because longer layer exposure should expectedly pro-
duce higher rates of Malfunction errors. It is noticeable 
that relatively fewer errors are generated at the layers 
close to the output layer. This is probably due to the 
gradual reduction of the 227×227×3 matrix input size 
at the first layer as it propagates and reaches the out-
put layer where the size is 13x13x256, before becoming 
a vector of 7 probabilities.
Most of the SDC errors (all categories) at the AlexNet 
output originate from faults that are related to the Conv. 
layers. Considering the size of input and filter numbers, 
it is evident that all the convolutional layers utilize the 
same kernels and possess the same AVF and PVF val-
ues. Nevertheless, Fig. 7, 8, and 9 shows that the pos-
sibility of an output model being impacted by injection 
is mainly dependent on the position of the layer in the 
network. This is particularly evident in layer 7 which is 
located just after convolutional layers. Herein, Softmax 
is observed to be the most reliable layer because no er-
ror is generated in this layer and most of the Malfunc-
tion and Light-Malfunction are masked. This can be 
attributed to two main reasons. Firstly, contrary to the 
case for other layers, Softmax is invoked just once and 
this significantly reduces its execution time thereby 
making it almost impossible for errors to generate in it. 
Secondly, the vector probability functionality of Soft-
max sums up to one. Therefore,  even if SDC (Malfunc-
tion and Light-Malfunction) alters the input value of 
Softmax, there could still be retention of a probability 
percentage such that error will be No-Malfunction. The 
scores of a  vast majority of the output-probability are 
zeros because the classified object should bear similar-
ity with some of the remaining objects among the 7 
classes needed for classification. This is a confirmation 
of the underlying feature of the ANNs, which is fault tol-
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No-Malfunction DUE Light-Malfunction Malfunction
Fig. 5. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for IOA mode
fig. 4. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for RF mode














































No-Malfunction DUE Light-Malfunction Malfunction
Fig. 5. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for IOA mode
fig. 6. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for IOV mode
fig. 7. AVF of RF Mode layer for Malfunction SDCs,  
Light-Malfunction SDCs, No-Malfunction SDCs and DUE
fig. 8. PVF of IOA Mode layer for Malfunction SDCs,  
Light-Malfunction SDCs, No-Malfunction SDCs and DUE AlexNet
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fig. 9. PVF of IOV Mode layer for Malfunction SDCs,  
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7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND 
ANALYSIS WITH SHS
7.1. CKV ANAlYSIS
In RF, IOA, and IOV kernels in Fig. 10, Fig. 11, and Figure 
12 respectively, we evaluated the kernels by applying 
our SHS. Based on our analysis in section (5.1) the top-2 
vulnerable kernels for AlexNet are Im2col and Add_bias 
in all three modes. All the Malfunction SDCs in these 
kernels become No-Malfunction. Our technique shows 
significant improvement in the AlexNet model, the er-
rors in top-2 vulnerable kernels (Im2col and Add_bias). 
The errors in RF mode reduce from 5.90% to 0.00% Light-
Malfunction in Im2col and from 0.90% to 0.00% Light-
Malfunction in Add_bias, while there is not any modifi-
cation on both kernels in Malfunction errors (still zero). 
Whereas, the errors in IOA mode reduce from 14.20% 
to 0.00% Im2col and 1.90% to 0.10% Add_bias in Light-
Malfunction. Meanwhile, there is not any change in both 
kernels in Malfunction errors (still zero). They are also 
significantly improved in IOV mode, where errors are re-
duced from 9.82% to 0.78% in Im2col and 2.69% to 0.12 
in Add bias in Light-Malfunction.
fig. 10. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for 
RF mode after applying our SHS
fig. 11. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models for 
IOA mode after applying our SHS
fig. 12. Kernels vulnerability of AlexNet models  for  
IOV model after applying our SHS
7.2 ClV ANAlYSIS
In this subsection, the resilience of the AlexNet was 
reevaluated from a layer perspective through analysis of 
the resilience of the layer after applying our technique. 
As error propagates through layers is the main target in 
this phase, we measure all types of SDC errors including 
100
Malfunction SDCs, Light-Malfunction SDCs, No-Malfunc-
tion  SDCs, and DUEs. Fig. 13 shows the RF model after ap-
plying our mitigation technique, the experimental result 
shows only 0.00% and 0.30% errors of Malfunction and 
Light-Malfunction respectively. While it still produced a 
big amount of No-Malfunction SDCs in the percentage 
of 62.80 %. Despite the amount of the DUEs still high at 
36.90%. On the anther hand, Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show IOA 
and IOV, both of the modes produced less amount of the 
DUEs 16.55% and 15.6% respectively, compared to the RF 
mode, and the reason that IOA and IOV have a different 
level of injections. Therefore, in Fig. 14 IOA, produced Mal-
function and Light-Malfunction on average 0.01% and 
0.09% respectively, meanwhile most of the errors 82.10% 
No-Malfunction SDCs. On the anther hand, IOV in Fig. 15 
produced less amount of the Malfunction and Light-Mal-
function on average 0.08% and 0.19% respectively, where 
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IOV Malfunction Light-Malfunction No-Malfunction DUE
fig. 13. AVF of each layer (after applying our SHS)
fig. 14. PVF of each layer (after applying our SHS)
fig. 15. PVF of each (after applying our SHS)
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In this section, we evaluate our proposed solution by 
measured the performance overheads for whole mod-
els (AlexNet) and vulnerability kernels. By calculating the 
execution time (performance) for the whole model and 
the vulnerable kernels before and after implementing 
our technique. Table 2 shows the overheads of our tech-
nique, DMR, and TMR techniques summarizes the error 
injection, and each kernel after applying our mitigation 
strategy technique. As our technique to achieve a low-
overhead with sufficient reliability, we selectively hard-
ened only the vulnerability kernels. Consequently, the 
overhead can be reduced, by exploiting the SHS that is 
executed and overhead has only increased by 0.2923%, 
thus improved the reliability of models. Compared to the 
DMR and TMR whereas the overhead increased 97.461% 
and 200.881% respectively. Therefore, our technique 
shows highly significant error mitigation by only hard-
ened selective kernels. And removed the unnecessary 
overhead especially in the safety-critical system (health-
care applications) that comes with strict deadlines, the 
overhead associated with duplication whole model is 
unacceptable.
table 2. Comparison of overhead of Unhardened model, S-MTTM-R, DMR and TMR
Kernels (time by MS) Number of invocations Unhardened ShS DMR tMR
Im2col 5 0.0002303 0.0104156 0.0208312 0.0312468
Add_bias 5 0.000708 0.0035207 0.0070414 0.0105621
Maxpool 4 0.0237066 0.0237066 0.0474132 0.0711198
Activation 8 0.4267208 0.3935817 0.7871634 1.1807451
Fill 5 0.0948266 0.14224 0.2844858 0.4267258
Softmax 1 0.1201457 0.0948267 0.1896534 0.2844801
The whole model 1 0.666338 0.6682913 1.3157572 2.0048797
8. CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we analyzed and evaluated the Mal-
function and  Light-Malfunction SDCs of soft errors for the 
AlexNet model on the GPU. Our CKV and CLV identify the 
most vulnerable kernels and layers. Based on the analysis in 
Section 5 on the reliability of the model’s bit sensitivity, the 
vulnerable bits can be selectively protected using SHS. Our 
result shows a high reduction rate of errors in the top vulner-
able kernels such as Im2col and Add_bias. Besides, the model 
achieved a high reduction in No-Malfunction from 54.9%, 
67.9%, and 59.4% to 62.80%, 82.10%, and 80.76% in the three 
modes such as RF, IOA, and IOV, respectively. Moreover, the 
performance overhead of our solution is compared with the 
well-known protection techniques such as Algorithm-Based 
Fault Tolerance (ABFT), Double Modular Redundancy (DMR), 
and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). The proposed solu-
tion shows the least overhead while correcting up to about 
82.8% of the SDC errors in a CNN, thereby remarkably im-
proving the healthcare domain’s model reliability.
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